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Abstract
Steer-by-wire (SBW) systems, which have no mechanical linkage between
the steering wheel and front wheels, are expected to improve vehicle safety
through better steering capability. SBW system failures, however, can cause
hazardous driving situations. This paper introduces fault-tolerant architec-
ture based on diversified steering mechanisms consisting of SBW backed up
with steering by braking and acceleration during SBW failures. These backup
steering functions are chosen according to driver’s intention of deceleration
and acceleration. A loss of SBW function during front-obstacle avoidance
on a straight highway is investigated by driving simulator experiments. The
results show that the driver can maneuver the vehicle by the steering wheel
during the SBW failures. Both cost and volume increase by excessive re-
dundancy within SBW is avoided by the diversified design, thus facilitating
SBW application on new-generation vehicles.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Steer-by-wire (SBW) systems, which have no mechanical linkage, are ex-
pected to improve both passive safety and active safety. Concerning passive
safety, impact to the driver via the mechanical linkage during front-end col-
lisions is reduced, and concerning active safety, vehicle stability and steering
maneuverability are improved by electronic control [1].
SBW system failure, on the other hand, can lead to unsafe driving situa-
tions. In the case of airplanes, significant redundancy in fly-by-wire systems
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is effective avoiding hazardous failures. In the case of mass-produced pas-
senger vehicle, however, it is difficult to install SBW systems with sufficient
redundancy because of the increased cost, volume and weight.
Electronic stability control (ESC) has been developed to enhance vehicle
stability via braking force control. Many vehicles are now equipped with
ESC, which is recognized as a useful device to improve vehicle stability. In
the near future, a new automobile regulation will require every vehicle to be
equipped with ESC.
Some vehicles are equipped with a driving-torque distribution (DTD)
device to enhance vehicle stability but via driving-torque (acceleration) [2-
4].
Vehicles with an electric motor on each wheel are now being developed to
achieve innovative vehicle movement by independent control of braking force
and driving-torque [5].
However, these devices assume in normal driving conditions without steer-
ing system failure.
This paper proposes a fault-tolerant architecture including ESC, DTD
and SBW to cope with SBW failures. Driving simulator experiments are
performed to evaluate the integrated architecture under SBW failure.
2. BASIC STRUCTURE OF SBW SYSTEM
Figure 1 shows an example of a basic SBW system architecture. It con-
sists of steering wheel angle sensor 1; resistance torque actuator 2; steering
actuator 3; front wheel angle sensor 4; electronic controllers (ECUs) 5; and
some conventional sensors 6 to monitor vehicle speed, lateral acceleration
and yaw rate.
2.1. Steering actuator
A typical steering actuator, like the one shown in Figure 1, consists of a
ball screw and an electric motor in a concentric arrangement with a steering
rod axis between front wheels. Other types of steering actuators consist of
rack and pinion mechanism and electric motor with a reduction gear. The
ball screw type steering actuator exhibits more accurate and quicker response
with less friction, less backlash, and higher stiffness.
2
2.2. Resistance torque actuator
The resistance torque actuator consists of a steering shaft and an electric
motor with a reduction gear for resistance torque against the driver’s steering
maneuvering. This portion of SBW is light in weight and small in volume,
contributing to a comfortable cabin and a flexible cockpit design as compared
with conventional power steering.
2.3. Basic control
Figure 2 shows an example of a basic control diagram. Front wheel an-
gle reference δ∗ = Kδ(V )·δh is determined from steering wheel angle δh and
vehicle speed V . The virtual gear ratio Kδ(V ) can be realized without re-
quiring mechanical elements. Resistance torque reference T ∗r is determined
from steering wheel angle δh and vehicle speed V .
The flexible reference signals δ∗ and T ∗r are one of the advantages of the
SBW system[6, 7].
3. STEERING ACTUATOR FAILURE
A failure of the steering actuator causes a loss of steering. Figure 3 shows
a state transition diagram of the baseline structure of Figure 1. Symbol
”A” denotes the normal state. When the steering actuator fails in state
”A”, the SBW loses steering function and transits to state ”B”, where the
driver cannot steer the vehicle.The baseline structure is not fault-tolerant for
steering actuator failure.
Failure of the resistance torque actuator in state ”A” causes the SBW to
transition to state ”C”, where the driver can still steer the vehicle without
resistance force. State ”C” is not so serious as state ”B”.
Fault-tolerant capability must be implemented. The SBW system should
be able to maintain steering in degraded modes under component failures.
A redundancy system is an approach to coping with the component fail-
ures [8].In the subsequent section, we discuss backup architectures for steer-
ing actuator failure having serious influence.
4. REDUNDANCY AND DIVERSITY OF ARCHITECTURE
Section 4.1 presents a mechanical backup diversity and Section 4.2 presents
a motor redundancy. Section 4.3 combines these two architectures, resulting
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in a structural complication due to addition of the mechanical diversity. Sec-
tion 4.4 gives a less complicated diversification by using on-board systems
outside the SBW. This diversification is described in Section 5 and thereafter.
4.1. Mechanical backup
Amechanical connection between the steering wheel and steering actuator
is established when the steering actuator fails.
The steering wheel shaft and the steering actuator can be connected via
a mechanical linkage as shown in Figure 4 comprising the cable wire 1 and
pulleys and clutch 2. The clutch connects the steering wheel shaft with the
pulley axis during steering failure. The steering force from the driver can
now be transmitted to the front wheels via the wire.
The resistance torque actuator can be used to assist the driver’s steer-
ing force in similar conventional electric power steering. The driver can be
informed of the steering actuator failure by a haptic signal such as small
vibrations of the steering wheel. The controller detects the steering actuator
failure by a comparison between front wheel angle measurement as actuator
output and electric motor current as actuator input.
4.2. Electric motor backup
This architecture is shown in Figure 5 with two redundant motors and
ECUs. In the case of a failure of principal motor 1, the SBW system can be
operated by standby motor 3.
4.3. Mechanical cable wire and electric motor backup
To cope with multiple failures, an architecture based on diversity [9] must
be considered. An architecture with mechanical and electric redundancies is
shown in Figure 6. Figure 7 shows a state-transition diagram for the archi-
tecture. Even when two steering actuators fail simultaneously by a common
cause transition from ”A” to ”E” or from ”C” to ”F”, the SBW system can
maintain the steering function in state ”E” or ”F”, where the driver can steer
the vehicle by cable wire.
4.4. Backup with systems outside the SBW
An elaborate solution to decrease SBW failure with higher redundancy
and diversity than the one in Figure 6 increases cost, weight, and volume for
SBW systems.
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A backup of SBW by an another preexisting on-board system, is necessary
to further increase steering reliability, to avoid cost increase by an excessive
redundancy, and to facilitate SBW systems on a commercial basis.
5. YAW MOMENT MANAGEMENT
We now propose a fault-tolerant steering architecture based on yaw mo-
ment management with SBW, ESC and DTD shown in Figure 8. This can
be called yaw-moment integrated-control. The steering wheel can now be
regarded as a component that not only steers the front wheels, but also
manages the vehicle yaw moment by ESC and DTD.
The integrated architecture mitigates the effects of steering actuator fail-
ures. In other words, the integration alleviates requirements for steering ac-
tuator reliability. The duplex redundancy for the steering actuator becomes
practical, because the third backup is provided by the ESC and DTD.
5.1. Operation
Figure 9 shows operation in terms of state-transition in the integrated
control architecture starting with SBW failure. ESC or DTD initiated fail-
ures in state ”A”, ”B”, ”C” and ”D” can be easily dealt by stopping the
vehicle after nullification of the corresponding functions. These transitions
are not shown to simplify the diagram. The failures in state ”E” or ”F”
cause a transition to state ”G”.
State ”A” is the normal state. Abnormal events are continuously moni-
tored. A transition to state ”B” with standby actuator occurs automatically
without significant delay when principal steering actuator fails. The driver
is advised to stop the vehicle to confirm the principal actuator failures for
safety.
A transition from the state ”B” to the state ”B0 ” occurs when the driver
voluntarily stops the vehicle.
A transition to state ”E” occurs when the standby steering actuator fails
in state ”B”. In state ”E”, the driver can voluntarily steer and stop the
vehicle by using integrated control.
Some drivers continue driving in state ”E”. A transition to state ”F”
occurs when the resistance torque actuator fails.
Loss of steering function occurs when both ESC and DTD fails.
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5.2. Priority on driver’s operation
During vehicle stability control, active braking control decrease the ve-
hicle speed. However, during real driving situations, the driver’s judgment
and operation should have first priority. For instance, consider the following
situation shown in Figure 10.
There are two vehicles around subject vehicle (I) on a straight highway.
One is following (II) and the another is on the right side (III).
Suppose that the subject driver detects a front obstacle in state ”E” or
”F” of Figure 9. The driver avoids the obstacle and rear-end collision with
the vehicle (II) by following maneuvering.
1. Acceleration to a velocity higher than vehicle (III) on the right side.
2. Lane change toward the front of vehicle (III).
3. Vehicle (I) stops in the far right lane.
The system has to generate the yaw moment by DTD during the lane
change because the vehicle must accelerate. An algorithm is installed to
activate a suitable control mode, as shown in Figure 11.
In normal state, neither ESC nor DTD is operated. Vehicle yaw rate
is controlled solely by steering actuator (i). When principal and stand-by
steering actuators fail (ii), the driver’s intention is examined (iii). In the
case of acceleration, yaw moment is controlled by DTD for acceleration (iv).
Otherwise, ESC is activated (v).
A forward collision warning system may facilitate the initiation of ob-
stacle avoidance. The driver’s operation should override a lane departure
prevention system if it is installed.
6. VEHICLE DYNAMICS SIMULATION
The proposed architecture was examined by a driving simulator. A test
participant is a man in middle thirties, who has no special skill except for
over 10 years driving experience.
6.1. Driving simulator
The driving simulator used for the driver-vehicle closed-loop simulation
test is shown in Figure 12. Cockpit motion is simulated by a 6-axis actuator.
Visual information is presented to the driver on a spherical screen, and the
vehicle behavior is calculated by a familiar four-wheel vehicle model.
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6.2. Driving task
The driver’s maneuvering during the front obstacle avoidance situation is
shown in Figure 10. Simultaneous failures of steering actuators occur when
vehicle (I) is on a straight highway section of Figure 10. A test participant
is instructed to make a lane change to stop the vehicle on the far right lane
avoiding front obstacle and rear-end collision with vehicle (II) and (III). This
type of maneuvering is the only way to avoid an accident in the dangerous
situation shown in Figure 10. He isn’t informed of the time of SBW failure nor
the time of obstacle appearance. The vehicle speed is at 27.8m/s (100km/h)
and the state is ”E”.
The problem is whether the integrated control enables the driver to ex-
ecute the instruction safely by using the steering wheel, acceleration pedal
and brake pedal in an ordinary way.
6.3. Simulation results
Figure 13 shows time series data regarding the acceleration pedal posi-
tion (a), brake pedal position (a), steering wheel angle (b), longitudinal force (c),
yaw rate (d), vehicle speed (e), lateral displacement (f) and warning signal (g).
First, the driver operates the acceleration pedal in order to overtake the
vehicle (III) to its right (Fig.13 a-1). Second, the steering wheel is operated
to carry out lane change (Fig.13 b-2). As a result, yaw rate is generated by
DTD (Fig.13 d-3) and overtaking is achieved (Fig.13 f-4). After generating
enough yaw rate, the driver counter-steers the steering wheel in order to
straighten the vehicle. The brake pedal is then applied in order to stop the
vehicle (Fig.13 a-5). According to these operations, the yaw rate is decreased
by ESC (Fig.13 d-6). The vehicle is stopped safely (Fig.13 e-7).
The result shown in Figure 13 is the one for the single participant. This
indicates a potential feasibility of the fault-tolerant automobile steering in
accident-prone situations with serious steering failures. A few other subjects
participated in the experiment. All of them could avoid the accident although
their trajectories were not so smooth as Figure 13. A more elaborate study
such as a quantification of avoidance probability is a future subject.
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7. CONCLUSION
1. Fault-tolerant yaw moment management is realized by SBW, ESC and
DTD. Either ESC or DTD is activated according to the driver’s inten-
tions during SBW failures.
2. The driver-vehicle closed-loop simulation shows feasibility to cope with
the loss of SBW during front-obstacle avoidance on a straight highway
with vehicles following and to the right.
3. The proposed architecture has a potential to improve vehicle safety and
reliability by diversification of steering mechanisms without excessive
redundancy inside the SBW system.
This architecture is expected to facilitate use of SBW, an indispensable
system for passenger vehicles of new generation.
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